by the author. Prinz's coverage of interesting experiments is a major highlight, impressive in scope and dizzying in details. There is much to learn from and admire in the book, and I strongly recommend it to empirically minded theorists of consciousness.
Chapter 1 provides desiderata for a theory of consciousness and critically comments on The well-studied visual agnosic patient, D.F., has defective visual experience of objects and shapes though preserved texture and colour experience. Neuroimaging has localized the bulk of her brain lesions to the lateral occipital complex (LOC), an area thought to be important in object and shape processing (T. W. James et al. 'Ventral occipital lesions impair object recognition but not object-directed grasping: an fMRI study ' Brain, 2003 ' Brain, , 126: 2563 . Prinz locates LOC in high-level vision, but the evidence from D.F. Prinz notes that the cueing paradigm only establishes attention to a location, not to an object. Posner cueing, however, involves object attention as well. After all, to perform the task, the subject must issue a report about a specific object and not a location. To my mind, it is a strange position to allow that attention gets pulled by the cue but then simply leaves the scene when the target to be reported on appears. Rather, attention is also needed to selecting the target to inform the subject's report, as the task requires. In many cases, such selection for task suffices for attention. In reporting on the presence of a target, G.Y. thus attends to an object that he cannot consciously see. Prinz is correct that spatial cueing is deployed as a test for spatial attention, but the standard construal of the paradigm misses the essential involvement of object attention (for recent work suggesting , Attention: Philosophical and Psychological Essays, 2012, Oxford University Press, pp. 78-96) . Indeed, it is arguable that any intention to move the eye to location X requires prior attention to X to make possible an intention with that very content. In other words, covert attention is needed to provide the targeting needed for orienting. The point then is that the relevant intention to move the eye might both cause and depend on attention. While I think Prinz's appeal to intention is interesting, the fact William James once noted that consciousness is of the essence of attention. The Kentridge work Prinz discusses as well as experiments on visually guided action have convinced me that consciousness is not. Attention can be, and often is, unconscious.
Recent empirical work has also suggested that attention is of the essence of consciousness, and Prinz is a notable proponent of that view. We can, however, also reject that link even as we acknowledge that the two phenomena are often deeply intertwined. On this, Prinz is to my mind surely right and the subtitle of the book expresses a truth: attention engenders consciousness. This is in fact how it often goes. 
